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I. INTRODUCTION
Sheila James begins her daily eighty-mile commute at 4:00 a.m.1 Ms. James is
a 62-year-old public health adviser who lives in Stockton, yet she works for the
United States Department of Health and Human Services in San Francisco. 2 She
begins her commute this early because she cannot afford to live near where she
works.3 San Francisco is one of the most expensive metropolitan areas in the
United States.4 Ms. James exchanged cheaper housing for a lengthy commute.5
However, this exchange requires her to take two trains and a bus to commute the
eighty miles from Stockton to San Francisco.6
Ms. James did not always have such a long commute—she used to live in
Alameda, which is only fifteen miles from her work in San Francisco. 7 However,
when a developer repurposed Ms. James’ apartment building and evicted her, she
moved to Stockton.8 She was able to find a three-bedroom house for $1,000 per
month in Stockton, whereas her one-bedroom apartment in Alameda cost $1,600.9
Many people desire to live in California because of its temperate climate,
beautiful coastline, and well-established economic centers.10 The majority of
Californians live in coastal areas. 11 These factors, combined with an insufficient
amount of housing, result in an increase in housing prices. 12 The increased housing
prices in the coastal areas led many people, like Ms. James, to move inland—
unintentionally increasing the inland housing prices as well. 13
Senate Bill (“SB”) 902 focused on increasing housing units per parcel to tackle
California’s housing shortage.14 It would have granted local government the power
to enact zoning ordinances rezoning any parcel and increasing the amount of
housing units allowed per individual parcel. 15 However, local government can
enact these zoning ordinances even if there are local initiatives expressly

1. Conor Dougherty & Andrew Burton, A 2:15 Alarm, 2 Trains and a Bus Get Her to Work by 7 A.M.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/business/economy/san-franciscocommute.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 10 (2015), available at https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/housing-costs.pdf
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Dougherty & Burton, supra note 1.
14. Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 1 (May 21, 2020).
15. Id., at 3.
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prohibiting them from enacting such ordinances. 16 Although SB 902 sought to
increase the supply of housing, it would have unconstitutionally undermined local
initiatives, limited the information obtained from environmental reports, and
would have failed to address the housing affordability crisis. 17
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Land shortage in certain regions of California has long contributed to high
housing costs.18 This shortage is most evident in the coastal metropolitan areas. 19
In these coastal areas, the relatively low rate of housing construction further
aggravates the housing crisis. 20 Between 1980 and 2010, the amount of housing in
California’s coastal metropolitan regions increased by 32%, while the amount of
housing on the national level increased by 54% on average. 21 Moreover, in Los
Angeles and San Francisco, the amount of housing units only increased by 20%.22
There are three major issues that constrict new housing construction: local
resistance, environmental concerns, and land shortages. 23 Various cases and
statutes add to the legal complexities of tackling the housing shortage. 24 Section A
explains the local control of land use planning.25 Section B discusses the
environmental reporting requirements involved with developments.26 Section C
evaluates the means of increasing housing density to increase the number of
housing units with a limited amount land.27
A. Land Use Planning in California
The California Legislature delegates the responsibility of creating a general
plan to cities and counties.28 A city or county planning commission creates a
general plan, and the city council or county board of supervisors enacts that plan. 29
16. Id., at 6.
17. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. (establishing all political power as “inherent in the people”), and
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (extending the right to initiative to the voters of cities), with SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–
2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted) (allowing local governments to make local
initiatives a nullity by disregarding them); Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 6–
7 (May 21, 2020).
18. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 12–13.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. at 10–11.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 10–11.
23. Id. at 15.
24. See infra Section II.A–C (discussing how local and state government seek to alleviate the housing
shortage).
25. Infra Section II.A.
26. Infra Section II.B.
27. Infra Section II.C.
28. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (West 2020).
29. Id.
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The plan creates a policy that helps local officials develop and preserve resources
for the future.30 The land use element of a general plan determines and administers
the uses of land.31 To implement the land use element of a general plan, cities and
counties also adopt various zoning ordinances, laws, and regulations governing
land use and intensity.32 These zoning ordinances divide the city or county into
various zones and districts while also regulating the specific details of the buildings
and land in these zones.33
Land use planning is a function of local government under the California
Constitution’s police powers.34 However, the requirement of adopting a general
plan is a matter of statewide concern.35 Courts allocate jurisdictional sovereignty
and authority between the Legislature and charter cities by distinguishing between
a “municipal affair” and a matter of “statewide concern.” 36 Matters of statewide
concern primarily have regional impacts rather than truly being statewide.37 In
matters of statewide concern, state law supersedes charter cities. 38 However, in
matters of municipal affairs, the city charter preempts conflicting state law. 39
The Sixth District Court of Appeal considered the meaning of statewide
concern in Anderson v. City of San Jose.40 In this case, two low-income individuals
along with two housing advocacy groups challenged the City of San Jose, after it
enacted Policy 7-13 (“Policy”).41 The Policy was an ordinance to sell surplus
land.42 However, the Policy departed from the requirements of the Surplus Lands
Act by creating an exemption from the affordable housing restrictions for
developers.43 The Policy also allowed the City of San Jose to approve a sale of land
for purposes other than affordable housing and increased the income requirement
for affordable housing.44 The court held the shortage of land for developing

30. Id. § 65302.
31. Id. § 65302.
32. Id. § 65800.
33. See id. § 65850 (listing aspects of land use cities and counties may regulate); see also GOV’T § 65800
(“[I]t is [the Legislature’s] intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may
exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters.”).
34. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §7.
35. See GOV’T § 65700 (requiring charter cities to adopt a general plan).
36. Anderson v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. App. 5th 683, 702 (6th Dist. 2019); see GOV’T §§ 34100–34102
(describing how the California Constitution distinguishes between two types of cities—”chartered cities” and
“general law cities”—and how city charters grant charter cities its authority while the Legislature grants general
law cities its authority).
37. See Anderson, 42 Cal. App. 5th at 711 (describing a statewide concern as having regional effects).
38. DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 783 (1995).
39. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (establishing city charters as supreme over all laws regarding municipal
affairs); see also DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 784 (establishing that the process of amending a general plan is not a
statewide concern).
40. 42 Cal. App. 5th at 702.
41. Id. at 695.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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affordable housing is a statewide concern. 45 The court reasoned the land shortage
was a statewide concern because it had an effect beyond an individual
municipality’s jurisdiction.46
To better understand the relationship of local voters to land use planning,
Subsection 1 describes voters’ right to amend a general plan through local
initiatives.47 Subsection 2 discusses how a local referendum is available to
challenge zoning laws.48
1. Amending the General Plan through Local Initiative
In DeVita v. County of Napa, the California Supreme Court contemplated
voters’ right to amend a general plan through a local initiative. 49 In the November
1990 election, voters in Napa County approved Measure J. 50 To preserve
agricultural land, Measure J amended the land use element of Napa County’s
general plan until 2021.51 Furthermore, Measure J stipulated that only the voters
could amend the restrictions the initiative added.52 In response, a handful of Napa
County residents filed a complaint against the County of Napa and its board of
supervisors, seeking to overturn the initiative. 53 The two issues in the complaint
were: (1) voters could not amend the general plan through an initiative; and (2) the
initiative could not limit future boards of supervisors in their power to amend the
general plan.54
The Court first upheld the principle that the process of adopting and amending
a general plan is a municipal affair.55 The Court also reaffirmed that the California
Constitution guarantees the people’s power to a referendum and initiative. 56 The
extent of the people’s power to an initiative is equivalent to the power granted to
the local legislative body in enacting legislative acts.57 The Legislature also
established the means by which a board of supervisors could obtain information

45. Anderson, 42 Cal. App. 5th at 718.
46. Id. at 711.
47. Infra Subsection II.A.1; see CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9201 (West 2020) (describing local initiatives as the
process by which local voters may propose municipal ordinances).
48. Infra Subsection II.A.2; see ELEC. § 9237 (describing the process of a local referendum as the ability
of local voters to suspend any municipal ordinance by petition).
49. 9 Cal. 4th 763, 771 (1995).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 772.
55. Id. at 774.
56. Id. at 775 (“Initiative and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city and county
under procedures that the Legislature shall provide. This section does not affect a city having a charter.”) (citing
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11).
57. Id. at 776.
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on amendments to the general plan.58 Consequently, the Court concluded that by
establishing these statutes by which the supervisors could obtain this information,
the Legislature granted voters the power to amend a general plan through an
initiative.59 Since Measure J amended the general plan, the DeVita Court only
discussed amendments to general plans and not voter initiatives or referenda on
zoning ordinances.60
2. Challenging Zoning Ordinances through Local Referendum
In City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey, the California Supreme Court considered
whether a local referendum could challenge a zoning amendment.61 In November
2014, the City of Morgan Hill amended its general plan. 62 This amendment
changed the land use designation of a vacant lot from “industrial” to
“commercial.”63 Although the Legislature grants cities and counties maximum
control over local zoning matters, it requires the local governing body to adopt
zoning ordinances consistent with the general plan.64
The zoning designation of the vacant lot was “IL-Light Industrial.”65
Consequently, this zoning designation was inconsistent with the “commercial”
land use designation found in the general plan.66 To make the zoning designation
consistent with the general plan, the city approved a zoning ordinance—changing
the zoning designation to “CG-General Commercial.”67 Due to opposition to
building a hotel on the lot, the Morgan Hill Hotel Coalition sent a request for a
referendum on this ordinance.68 The city council approved the referendum and
58. See id. at 777 (“[D]uring the circulation of the petition . . . the board of supervisors may refer the
proposed initiative measure to a county agency or agencies for a report on any or all of the following: . . . [its]
effect on the internal consistency of the county’s general and specific plans . . . .”) (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE §
9111 (2020)).
59. DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 772.
60. Id. at 771.
61. 5 Cal. 5th 1068, 1075 (2018).
62. Id. at 1076.
63. Id.
64. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65800 (West 2020) (“[I]t is [the Legislature’s] intention to provide only a
minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local
zoning matters.”); see also GOV’T § 65860 (West 2020) (“County or city zoning ordinances shall be consistent
with the general plan of the county or city.”).
65. City of Morgan Hill, 5 Cal. 5th at 1077; see Morgan Hill Municipal Code §§ 18.24.010, 18.26.010,
available at https://www.morgan-hill.ca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/28563/Title-18-Zoning (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (designating five commercial zoning designations—administrative Office
(“CO”), Neighborhood Commercial (“CN”), General Commercial (“CG”), Highway Commercial (“CH”), and
Service Commercial (“CS”)—and five industrial zoning designations—Commercial Industrial (“CI”), Light
Office Industrial (“IO”), Campus Industrial (“IC”), Light Industrial (“ML”), and General Industrial (“IG”)—for
the general plan).
66. Id. at 1076.
67. Id. at 1077.
68. Asit Panwala, The California Supreme Court’s Decision in City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey Will Not End
City Planning, SCOCABLOG (June 22, 2020), http://scocablog.com/the-california-supreme-courts-decision-in-
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scheduled it for June 2016.69 The City of Morgan Hill initiated legal proceedings
to strike the referendum from the ballot and confirm the zoning ordinance to avoid
a zoning designation inconsistent with the general plan. 70
The Court reaffirmed the California Constitution reserves the power of the
referendum to the people.71 The voters of the various cities and counties have the
same power of referendum to approve or deny local ordinances. 72 Further, the
Court concluded that the people can challenge a zoning ordinance amendment that
changes the zoning of a parcel to comply with a general plan amendment.73
Also, the Court held challenges to zoning ordinances are permissible where
there are other means available to make zoning consistent with a general plan. 74 A
successful referendum that challenges a zoning amendment prevents the zoning
amendment from going into effect—despite the previous zoning designation not
complying with the amended general plan. 75
B. California Environmental Quality Act
In 1970, California enacted the California Environmental Quality Act
(“CEQA”).76 As part of this law, the Legislature established that maintaining the
environment “is a matter of statewide concern.”77 Since maintaining
environmental quality was of paramount importance, the Legislature mandated
that a “project” have a minimal effect on the environment.78 Alternatively, the
proponents of a project must propose strategies to mitigate the environmental
impacts before a local agency could approve the project. 79
To accomplish this goal, the CEQA mandates that an agency prepare an
Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) to assess the environmental impact the
city-of-morgan-hill-v-bushey-will-not-end-city-planning (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
69. City of Morgan Hill, 5 Cal. 5th at 1077.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1078 (citing CAL CONST. art. IV, § 1).
72. Id. at 1078 (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11, subdiv. (a)).
73. City of Morgan Hill, 5 Cal. 5th at 1081.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21050 (West 2020).
77. PUB. RES. § 21000.
78. See PUB. RES. § 21002 (establishing that projects must have minimal effect on the environment prior
to approval); see also PUB. RES. § 21065.
“Project” means an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably
foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any of the following:
(a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency.
(b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in whole or in part, through contracts, grants, subsidies,
loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public agencies.
(c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement
for use by one or more public agencies.
Id.
79. PUB. RES. § 21002.
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project will impose on the environment.80 An EIR identifies the environmental
impact of a project, any alternatives to the proposed project, and strategies for
avoiding or mitigating impacts.81 CEQA requires every lead agency complete an
EIR for a project that agency will approve or undertake. 82 Developers must report
a broad range of environmental impacts in an EIR.83 Some of the impacts an EIR
must take into account include impacts on air quality, aesthetics, biological
resources, traffic, population, land use, and water quality. 84 Thus, an EIR informs
government officials about environmental concerns and consequences of a project
before an agency takes action.85 An EIR provides information that protects both
the environment and allows for informed governmental decisions. 86
In June 2019, the City of Berkeley filed a lawsuit against the University of
California Berkeley (“UC Berkeley”) claiming the university’s EIR inadequately
calculated the increase in student enrollment.87 The lawsuit claims that the
inadequate calculation resulted in a cost of $21 million per year to provide services
to UC Berkeley, while the cost was $11 million in 2003.88 Also, the requested
amount of $21 million represents an increase of over 1,000% of what the City of
Berkeley currently receives.89 Calls from UC Berkeley’s campus also account for
19% of all police calls, which increased from 14% in 2011.90 Likewise, calls for
firefighter responses make up 37% of all calls. 91 Additionally, there was an
increase in the effects of environmental and noise pollution, strain on the sewer
and storm drain system, and increased prices in the housing market. 92

80. PUB. RES. § 21002.1.
81. Id.
82. See PUB. RES. § 21100 (requiring lead agency to draft an environmental impact report “on any project
which they propose to carry out or approve”).
83. Elijah Chiland & Adrian Glick Kudler, A Guide to CEQA: California’s Environmental Law that
Developers Love to Hate, CURBED (Oct 10, 2018, 9:47 AM), https://la.curbed.com/2012/2/7/10398386/ceqacalifornia-environmental-quality-act-law (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
84. CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FORMAT AND GENERAL CONTENT
REQUIREMENTS
28
(2006),
available
at
https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/pds/ProjectPlanning/docs/EIR-Format-Content-Reqs.pdf (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
85. Friends of the Coll. of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 1 Cal. 5th 937, 944
(2016).
86. Id.
87. Frances Dinkelspiel, City Sues UC Berkeley for Not Studying Impacts of 30% Student Enrollment Hike,
BERKELEYSIDE (June 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.berkeleyside.com/2019/06/17/city-sues-uc-berkeley-fornot-studying-impacts-of-34-student-enrollment-increase (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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C. Tackling the Housing Shortage Through Upzoning
One attempt by the Legislature to combat the housing shortage was to allow
for and codify increased housing density through upzoning.93 The practice of
upzoning is the rezoning of a parcel to allow for higher density and/or allow for
taller buildings, usually housing.94 This practice increases the supply of housing
by allowing developers and builders to construct more housing units on the same
parcel.95
To tackle the housing shortage through upzoning, Senator Scott Wiener
introduced SB 50.96 That bill would have required local governments to grant
developers equitable community incentives in exchange for increased housing
density.97 These incentives granted developers waivers from density and parking
requirements.98 Additionally, if the new development was near a transit stop, the
developers would receive waivers from the height, floor area ratio, and minimum
parking requirements.99 However, SB 50 did not advance beyond the Senate
because it targeted local governments and lacked protection from displacement. 100
III. SENATE BILL 902
In response to SB 50’s failure, Senator Wiener introduced SB 902.101 SB 902
did not have any of the incentives found in SB 50.102 Rather, it sought to increase
housing density by streamlining the zoning process. 103
SB 902 represented the Legislature’s attempt to alleviate the housing shortage
by allowing for streamlined rezoning.104 This bill would have granted local

93. Diana Budds, Will Upzoning Neighborhoods Make Homes More Affordable?, CURBED (Jan. 30, 2020,
1:00 PM), https://www.curbed.com/2020/1/30/21115351/upzoning-definition-affordable-housing-gentrification
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Jenna Chadler, California’s Transit Density Bill Is Back. What Would it do to Los Angeles?, CURBED
(Jan. 7, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://la.curbed.com/2020/1/7/21054886/california-transit-density-bill-50 (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
97. SB 50, 2018 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended on Jan. 6, 2020, but not enacted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Liam Dillon & Taryn Luna, California Bill to Dramatically Increase Home Building Fails for the
Third Year in a Row, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020, 4:49 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0129/high-profile-california-housing-bill-to-allow-mid-rise-apartments-near-transit-falls-short (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
101. Evan Symon, Senator Wiener Introduces ‘SB 50 Lite’ Housing Bill to End Single-Family Zoning in
CA, CAL. GLOBE (May 22, 2020, 05:37 PM), https://californiaglobe.com/section-2/senator-wiener-introduces-sb50-lite-housing-bill/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
102. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
103. Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 3 (May 21, 2020).
104. Id.
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governments the authority to increase the density of residential parcels. 105 It would
have authorized a local government to enact an ordinance that would increase
residential density of any parcel up to ten units per parcel. 106 However, the parcel
must be in a “transit-rich area,” a “jobs-rich area,” or an “urban infill site.” 107
SB 902 would have granted local governments the ability to enact zoning
ordinances.108 These ordinances would be valid despite any voter-enacted
initiatives prohibiting the local government from enacting zoning ordinances.109
Further, the bill would have granted these ordinances an exemption from CEQA
environmental review.110
IV. ANALYSIS
During his campaign to become the Governor of California, Gavin Newsom
called for creating 3.5 million new housing units by 2025.111 He called for such a
development in hopes of tackling the housing affordability crisis. 112 However, SB
902 did not address the affordability crisis and instead may have been costly to
105. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
106. Id.
107. Id.
“Transit-rich area” means a parcel within one-half mile of a major transit stop or a parcel on a high-quality bus
corridor.
“Jobs-rich area” means an area identified by the Department of Housing and Community Development in
consultation with the Office of Planning and Research that is high opportunity and either is jobs rich or would
enable shorter commute distances based on whether, in a regional analysis, the tract meets both of the following:
(i) The tract is high opportunity, meaning its characteristics are associated with positive educational and economic
outcomes for households of all income levels residing in the tract.
(ii) The tract meets either of the following criteria:
(a) New housing sited in the tract would enable residents to live near more jobs than is typical for tracts in the
region.
(b) New housing sited in the tract would enable shorter commute distances for residents, relative to existing
commute patterns and jobs-housing fit.
“Urban infill site” means a site that satisfies all of the following:
(A) A site that is a legal parcel or parcels located in a city if, and only if, the city boundaries include some portion
of either an urbanized area or urban cluster, as designated by the United States Census Bureau, or, for
unincorporated areas, a legal parcel or parcels wholly within the boundaries of an urbanized area or urban cluster,
as designated by the United States Census Bureau.
(B) A site in which at least 75 percent of the perimeter of the site adjoins parcels that are developed with urban
uses. For the purposes of this section, parcels that are only separated by a street or highway shall be considered
to be adjoined.
(C) A site that is zoned for residential use or residential mixed-use development or has a general plan designation
that allows residential use or a mix of residential and nonresidential uses, with at least two-thirds of the square
footage of the development designated for residential use.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 2 (May 21, 2020).
111. Gavin Newsom, The California Dream Starts at Home, MEDIUM (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://medium.com/@GavinNewsom/the-california-dream-starts-at-home-9dbb38c51cae (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
112. Id.
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low-income earners.113
Section A explains the extent of the housing shortage. 114 Section B analyzes
SB 902’s impact on local voters.115 Section C addresses how the CEQA exemption
could have affected local government.116 Section D explores the concerns of the
negative effects of upzoning.117
A. Housing Shortage in California
SB 902 sought to alleviate the housing shortage in California through
increased housing density.118 According to a McKinsey Report, California ranks
49th in per capita housing—California has 358 homes for every 1,000 people.119
Only Utah has fewer homes with 347 per 1,000 people. 120 California “has 14
million homes for 39 million people,”; therefore, to attain the national average of
419 homes for every 1,000 people, California would need an additional 2 million
homes.121
The housing shortage creates a highly competitive housing market that
increases housing prices; however, this competitive housing market is somewhat
limited to the coastal metropolitan areas. 122 The increased prices price out many
people in the coastal areas.123 Consequently, the residents of the coastal areas move
113. See Budds, supra note 93 (explaining how upzoning can lead to an increase in the price of housing
and displacement).
114. Infra Section IV.A.
115. Infra Section IV.B.
116. Infra Section IV.C.
117. Infra Section IV.D.
118. Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 3 (May 21, 2020).
119. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, A TOOL KIT TO CLOSE CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING GAP: 3.5 MILLION
HOMES
BY
2025
3
(2016),
available
at
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Public%20and%20Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights
/Closing%20Californias%20housing%20gap/Closing-Californias-housing-gap-Full-report.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
120. Id.
121. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, A TOOL KIT TO CLOSE CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING GAP: 3.5 MILLION
HOMES
BY
2025
2
(2016),
available
at
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Public%20and%20Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights
/Closing%20Californias%20housing%20gap/Closing-Californias-housing-gap-Full-report.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
California’s underproduction of housing is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1970s, the state has added
6.7 million households and 19 million people, but only 6.2 million homes. This means that over a 40-year period,
the state added only 325 homes for every 1,000 additional people. During the same period, New York and New
Jersey added 1,007 and 681 homes, respectively, for every 1,000 additional people. It is therefore no surprise that
California faces a statewide shortage. Today, it has 14 million homes for 39 million people. Again, to put this
into context, if California had the same houses-to-people ratio as Texas, it would have 15.1 million homes. If it
were to match New York or New Jersey, California would have 16 million homes. Achieving the US average
would require 16.5 million homes. So, the state has a shortfall of between one million and 2.5 million homes.
Id.
122. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 10.
123. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 12.
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inland, which increases the housing prices in the inland metropolitan areas as
well.124 This is the situation in which Ms. James and many other workers like her
find themselves.125 The increased housing prices have had a ripple effect far into
California’s inland suburbs.126 Further, the high cost of living undoubtedly
contributes to California’s poverty rate which is the highest in the United States. 127
In introducing SB 902, Senator Wiener sought to grant local government
officials the ability to lessen the severe housing shortage in California through
upzoning.128 However, increasing density does not always lead to increased
supply.129 In 2013 and 2015, Chicago enacted policies that allowed for upzoning.130
However, these policies increased land values without increasing supply.131
Consequently, SB 902 may not have led to an increase in the supply of new housing
units.132
B. Senate Bill 902’s Impact on Local Voters
SB 902 would have granted local governments the authority to override local
voter initiatives that prevent local government from enacting zoning ordinances.133
This grant of authority undoubtedly raises concerns of whether local officials
should have such power.134 Any concern involving local voter initiatives will also
include local referenda because the California Constitution grants voters the power
of both.135 Subsection 1 discusses the effects of SB 902 on local initiatives.136
Subsection 2 evaluates the effects of SB 902 on local referenda. 137

124. Id.
125. See Dougherty & Burton, supra note 1 (describing how incomes did not increase with the increase in
housing prices, forcing many workers to move inland).
126. Dougherty & Burton, supra note 1.
127. See TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 28 (attributing the high poverty rate in California to the high cost of
living, primarily the high cost of housing).
128. Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 3 (May 21, 2020).
129. See Budds, supra note 93 (discussing a study in Chicago in which allowing for upzoning did not
increase the supply of housing units).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing for upzoning of parcels), with Yonah Freemark, Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a Zoning
Reform on Property Values and Housing Construction, 56 URB. AFF. REV. 758, 779 (2019) (discussing how
Chicago’s upzoning reforms did not increase new construction and permitting).
133. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
134. Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 6 (May 21, 2020).
135. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (granting power of initiative and referendum to electors of counties and
cities); see also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (reserving power of initiative and referendum with the people).
136. Infra Subsection IV.A.1.
137. Infra Subsection IV.A.2.
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1. Senate Bill 902 Would Have Unconstitutionally Undermined Local Voter
Initiatives
SB 902 specified that a local legislative body could pass a zoning ordinance,
even if a local voter initiative prohibits the body from doing so.138 This grant of
authority to a local legislative body renders local voter-enacted initiatives null.139
Consequently, SB 902would have violated the California Constitution because the
Constitution expressly guarantees the people the right to enact or reject ballot
initiatives.140
In DeVita, the California Supreme Court held that in certain cases the
Legislature could preclude the voters’ right of initiative. 141 The Court employed
two factors in determining whether the Legislature precludes voter initiatives. 142
The first is whether the Legislature granted the power to enact legislation to a
specific “city council” or “board of supervisors” or if the grant was to a generic
“legislative body.”143 The second is if the law pertains to a statewide concern or a
municipal affair.144
Under the first factor, references to a specific body like city council or board
of supervisors carry a greater inference toward excluding ballot measures by the
local voters.145 However, references to a generic legislative body may include the
electorate.146 SB 902 only referenced local government and legislative body and
not city council or board of supervisors.147 This absence of a direct grant to a
specific legislative body creates an inference that the Legislature did not intend
preclusion of initiatives. 148 Even if the “notwithstanding any local restrictions”
language negates the first factor, there is still the second factor to consider. 149
Under the second factor, courts determine whether a matter is of statewide
concern.150 In Anderson, the court established that an issue with regional effects is
more likely a statewide concern. 151 The court further established that the shortage

138. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
139. See SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted)
(allowing local governing bodies to disregard local voter initiatives limiting its power).
140. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11.
141. DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 776 (1995).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 776.
147. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
148. DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 776.
149. See SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted)
(granting local governing bodies authority to enact zoning ordinances “notwithstanding any local restriction”);
see also DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 776 (providing the two factors both of which a court evaluates).
150. Anderson v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. App. 5th 683, 702 (6th Dist. 2019).
151. Id. at 711.
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of lots for affordable housing is a matter of statewide concern.152 The dispositive
question in determining if SB 902 pertained to a statewide concern is whether
increasing housing density affects housing affordability. 153
SB 902 had a provision stating, “ensuring the adequate production of
affordable housing is a matter of statewide concern and is not a municipal
affair.”154 However, the Legislature adds such boilerplate language to many bills
and statutes.155 The court in Anderson reasoned a declaration by the Legislature
that a matter is a statewide concern does not mean the matter is in fact a statewide
concern.156 Courts decide whether something is a statewide concern or a municipal
affair.157 Beside the boilerplate language, SB 902 did not mention affordability or
low- and moderate-income housing as a requirement for the new housing
developments.158
Since SB 902 would have granted a local government the right to upzone and
the bill pertains to a municipal affair, it unlawfully overrides the voters’ right to
enact a municipal initiative. 159 By overriding this right of the initiative, SB 902
would have violated the California Constitution.160
2. Senate Bill 902 may Have Increased the Number of Local Referenda
SB 902 would have allowed local government officials to disregard voterenacted ordinances expressly prohibiting the local government from enacting
zoning ordinances.161 By ignoring the vote of the populace, SB 902 may have
increased the amount of local referenda challenging zoning ordinances. 162 The
152. Id. at 718.
153. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing local government to increase housing density), with Anderson, 42 Cal. App. 5th at 718
(establishing sites for affordable housing as a statewide concern).
154. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
155. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65850.01, 65850.5, 65850.55, 65850.6, 65850.7, 65860.1 (West 2020).
156. 42 Cal. App. 5th at 703.
157. Id.
158. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted); see
also Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 6 (May 21, 2020) (describing how the
opposition are concerned with the absence of an affordability requirement).
159. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (granting electors in cities the power to exercise the right of
initiative), and CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (granting charter cities supremacy in municipal affairs), with SB 902,
2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted) (allowing local
government to increase housing density), and Anderson, 42 Cal. App. 5th at 718 (establishing sites for affordable
housing as a statewide concern).
160. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (granting electors in cities the power to exercise the right of
initiative), with SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted)
(allowing local government to override local initiatives).
161. See SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted)
(allowing local governing bodies enact zoning ordinances despite local initiatives to the contrary).
162. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing local governing bodies to disregard local voter initiatives limiting its power), with Panwala,
supra note 68 (describing how local voters use referendum to overturn zoning ordinances they oppose).

380

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
second power the people reserve to themselves is the power of the referendum.163
This power grants voters the right to either “approve or reject statutes or parts of
statutes.”164 This right extends to the local level as well. 165
In City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey, the Supreme Court of California upheld the
right of local voters to challenge zoning ordinances through a referendum.166
During oral argument, one of the Justices inquired whether the facts would lead to
an increase in zoning ordinance referenda.167 After the Court ruled against the City
of Morgan Hill, city officials repealed the zoning ordinance fearing an
overwhelming repudiation at the ballot box.168
The County of San Benito presents another example where voters overturned
a local government’s decision due to widespread opposition.169 There, county
supervisors enacted a zoning ordinance rezoning four parcels to residential and
commercial designations.170 Subsequently, the local voters rejected this ordinance
by a large majority.171 The supervisors then adopted a similar ordinance rezoning
one of those parcels. 172 After this second ordinance, the voters began collecting
petitions for a second referendum.173 However, the Coronavirus pandemic in 2020
and the resulting stay-at-home order stalled that referendum.174 If locals disagree
with a zoning ordinance, they may overturn it with a referendum—as evidenced in
San Benito and Morgan Hill.175 Similarly, by allowing local governments to
disregard the will of the voters, SB 902 may have increased local referenda over
zoning ordinances.176

163. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
164. City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey, 5 Cal. 5th 1068, 1078 (2018) (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a)).
165. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11(a)).
166. Id. at 1091.
167. Panwala, supra note 68.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Erik Chalhoub, Judge Grants Temporary Suspension of Rezoning, SAN BENITO.COM (May 20, 2020),
https://sanbenito.com/judge-grants-temporary-suspension-of-rezoning/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
174. See id. (describing the stay-at-home orders effect on the vote gathering along with a lawsuit
“contending that the board violated election code by superseding the voters’ March rejection of Measure K
through the zoning change approval”).
175. Panwala, supra note 68.
176. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing local government to increase housing density despite local opposition), with Panwala, supra
note 68 (describing how local voters overturn zoning ordinances they oppose).
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C. CEQA Exemptions will Limit Valuable Information
SB 902 would have granted an exemption from CEQA environmental review
for any zoning ordinance that complies with this law. 177 This exemption would
have allowed a developer and the local agency to forego an EIR for a high-density
housing development.178
A lead governmental agency prepares an EIR based on an assessment of the
environmental impacts a project will impose. 179 The EIR must contain any
environmental impacts the project may have—including traffic, aesthetics,
parking, congestion, etc.180 This information is valuable because it ensures local
government officials would be able to make decisions that would cause the least
environmental harm.181
In June 2019, the City of Berkeley filed a lawsuit against UC Berkeley
claiming the University’s EIR inadequately calculated the increase in student
enrollment.182 The inaccurate EIR resulted in increased costs of servicing the
campus.183 Additionally, the inadequate EIR increased strain on the services that
first responders provide.184 Further, there was an increase in the effects of
environmental and noise pollution, strain on the sewer and storm drain system, and
increased prices in the housing market.185
SB 902 would have granted an exemption from CEQA review. 186 This
exemption would have allowed developers and agencies to bypass filing an EIR
on rezoned parcels. 187 By exempting new developments from CEQA, SB 902
would have eliminated the information local officials receive regarding the future
impacts of a new development from an EIR.188 This lack of information would
have possibly hindered the local government officials from accurately projecting
future service needs and impacts. 189 Consequently, the absence of the information
177. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
178. See SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted)
(providing that parcel upzoned by local government is not a project for purposes of CEQA).
179. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21157.1 (West 2020).
180. CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 84.
181. Friends of the Coll. of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 1 Cal. 5th 937, 944
(2016).
182. Dinkelspiel, supra note 87.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
187. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting a rezoned parcel is not a project for CEQA review), with CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21157.1
(West 2020) (describing projects that require environmental reports).
188. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting a rezoned parcel is not a project for CEQA review), with CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 84
(describing the various areas that an EIR must evaluate).
189. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting a rezoned parcel is not a project for CEQA review), with CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 84
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provided in an EIR could make it difficult to foresee and project the amount of
strain on existing services a proposed development could have.190 By limiting the
amount of information provided to municipal agencies, SB 902 may have caused
unforeseen impacts on city services and the surrounding environment.191
D. Negative Impact of Upzoning
Some legislators have proposed upzoning as a fix for the housing shortage.192
SB 902 was one such proposal, as it would have allowed up to ten housing units
on an individual parcel.193 One of the major arguments in favor of upzoning is that
building more units on one parcel increases supply and lowers costs. 194 However,
the ability to build multiple units on the same amount of land leads to an increase
in the value of that land.195 When Chicago implemented upzoning reforms in 2013
and 2015, the price of housing units increased between 12.2% and 13.2%.196
Further, these upzoning reforms did not increase the amount of new units.197
Similarly, SB 902 may not have led to an increase in the supply of new housing
units.198 SB 902 may have even led to an increase in housing prices that would
displace local low-income tenants.199
The media has criticized SB 902 referring to it as “SB 50 Lite.” 200 This
estimation is fair because SB 902, like SB 50, focuses on increasing housing
density.201 Although increasing housing density was optional under SB 902, the
bill could still have led many Californians to face displacement from upzoning.202
(describing the various areas that an EIR must evaluate), and Dinkelspiel, supra note 87 (detailing UC Berkeley’s
inadequate EIR and the subsequent financial, economic, and environmental impact).
190. See Dinkelspiel, supra note 87 (explaining how UC Berkeley’s failure to provide an accurate EIR
resulted in unforeseen impacts on city services and environment).
191. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting an exemption from CEQA environmental review to proposed developments with), with
Dinkelspiel, supra note 87 (detailing UC Berkeley’s inadequate EIR and the subsequent financial, economic, and
environmental impact).
192. Budds, supra note 93.
193. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
194. Blanket Upzoning—a Blunt Instrument—Won’t Solve the Affordable Housing Crisis, THE PLANNING
REPORT (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.planningreport.com/2019/03/15/blanket-upzoning-blunt-instrument-wontsolve-affordable-housing-crisis (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
195. Budds, supra note 93.
196. See Freemark, supra note 132, at 773 (discussing degree of change in property transaction prices).
197. See id. at 779 (discussing degree of change in new construction and permitting).
198. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing for upzoning of parcels), with Freemark, supra note 132, at 779 (discussing how Chicago’s
upzoning reforms did not increase new construction and permitting).
199. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing for upzoning of parcels), with Budds, supra note 93 (arguing that upzoning alone does not
create affordable housing).
200. Symon, supra note 101.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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Since upzoning allows for multiple units on one parcel, this leads to an increase in
the value of that land as developers gain a larger profit from constructing multiple
housing units.203 These more expensive lots lead to increased housing prices,
which prices people out of the housing market. 204 This fear of gentrification and
displacement is one of the reasons SB 50 failed.205 Since SB 902 did not contain a
housing affordability requirement, the bill induces the same fear of displacement
that SB 50 induced.206
V. CONCLUSION
SB 902 would have allowed for upzoning parcels. 207 It would have granted
local government the authority to increase the amount of permitted housing units
in any parcel to ten.208 However, increasing the amount of housing units allowed
in a parcel also increases the value of that parcel. 209 Due to the high cost of land,
the subsequent cost of housing increases.210 The new market-rate housing displaces
existing tenants without providing any affordable housing.211 This displacement
results in an exodus of people from the coastal metropolitan areas to other regions
of the state—usually the Central Valley.212 Subsequently, people move from
coastal regions either because housing prices price them out of the market, or, like
Ms. James, they are able to buy better housing at a lower cost elsewhere. 213
SB 902 would have also granted an exemption from CEQA review.214
However, this exemption would have undermined local government officials by
limiting the valuable information they receive from an EIR.215 Furthermore, this
lack of information would have inhibited local officials from making accurate

203. Budds, supra note 93.
204. Symon, supra note 101; see Budds, supra note 93 (explaining how increasing the amount of units
allowed on an individual parcel makes the land more valuable).
205. Sandy Perry, SB 50 Will Worsen Renters’ Displacement Crisis, SAN JOSE SPOTLIGHT (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://sanjosespotlight.com/perry-sb-50-will-worsen-renters-displacement-crisis/ (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
206. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted); see
also Senate Committee on Housing, Committee Analysis of SB 902, at 6 (May 21, 2020) (describing how the
opposition are concerned with the absence of an affordability requirement).
207. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
208. Id.
209. Budds, supra note 93.
210. See Budds, supra note 93 (explaining how upzoning leads to luxury market-rate housing).
211. Budds, supra note 93.
212. Dougherty & Burton, supra note 1.
213. See Dougherty & Burton, supra note 1 (detailing how workers in the Bay Area are better able to
afford housing in the Central Valley rather than the Bay Area).
214. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
215. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting a rezoned parcel is not a project for CEQA review), with CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 84
(describing the various areas that an EIR must evaluate).
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projections for the future. 216 Relying on limited information may increase the
unforeseen costs, strain municipal services, and have negative impacts on the
environment.217
SB 902 likewise would have allowed local government to enact ordinances
despite local voter opposition.218 By ignoring the desire of voters, SB 902 may
have increased local referenda challenging the zoning ordinances local
governments will attempt to enact. 219 More importantly, SB 902 would have
permitted local government to enact legislation “notwithstanding any local
restrictions.”220 Such blatant disregard for local initiatives would render local
initiatives meaningless. 221 Finally, and most importantly, SB 902 would have
overridden the voters’ right to enact local restrictions on local government—
undermining the constitutional right to initiative.222 This Constitutional violation
strikes at the very heart of California’s form of government: direct democracy. 223

216. See Dinkelspiel, supra note 87 (detailing UC Berkeley’s inaccurate EIR and the unanticipated
subsequent financial, economic, and environmental impact).
217. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting an exemption from CEQA environmental review to proposed developments with), with
Dinkelspiel, supra note 87 (detailing UC Berkeley’s inadequate EIR and the unforeseen financial, economic, and
environmental impact).
218. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
219. Compare SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not
enacted) (allowing local governing bodies to disregard local voter initiatives limiting its power), with Panwala,
supra note 68 (describing how local voters overturn zoning ordinances they oppose).
220. SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted).
221. See id. (allowing local governing bodies to disregard local voter initiatives limiting its power to enact
zoning ordinances).
222. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. (establishing all political power as “inherent in the people”), and
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (extending the right to initiative to the voters of cities), with SB 902, 2020 Leg., 2019–
2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on May 21, 2020, but not enacted) (allowing local governments to make local
initiatives a nullity by disregarding them).
223. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; (finding that all the political power resides with the people).
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